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KENTUCKY'S "PAY-AS-YOU-GO" PLAN FOR
MUNICIPALITIES
In the recent case of City of Winchester v. Winchester
Bank,' decided by the Kentucky Court of Appeals, the bank
instituted suit to recover on two demand notes executed by the
city The city denied liability principally on the ground that the
notes were renewals of former notes which had become void be-
cause not paid out of the revenues levied and collected by the
city for the year in which the obligations represented by the
notes were created.
This defense was based on Section 157 of the Kentucky
Constitution which provides in part
"No county .city, town, taxing district, or other munici-
pality shall be authorized or permitted to become
indebted, in any manner or for any purpose, to an
amount exceeding, in any year, the income and revenue
provided for such year, without the assent of two-thirds
of the voters thereof, voting at an election to be held
for that purpose; and any indebtedness contracted in
violation of this section shall be void. Nor shall such
contract be enforceable by the person with whom made;
nor shall any municipality ever be authorized to assume
the same."'
McQuillin, in The Law of Afunicipal Corporations, seemed
accurately to interpret such a provision when he stated that it
requires "municipal corporations to adopt the safe, sane and
,conservative plan of pay-as-you-go, consequently each year's
income and revenue must pay each year's indebtedness and lia-
bility and no indebtedness or liability incurred in any one year
shall be paid out of the income or revenue of any future year. 1 3
The Court, however, applied a rule which may be expressed,
"Once valid always valid," and held that for an obligation to
be void under the above section of the Constitution it must con-
stitute an indebtedness, at the time it was made, m excess of the
305 Ky 45, 205 S.W 2d 997 (1947) (rehearing denied Decem-
ber 12, 1947)
See KY. R. S. (1946) sec. 92.360 (2) (The legislative body of
any city of the second to sixth class shall not, mn any year, expend
any money in excess of the amount levied and collected for that
year). One wonders how this provision can be enforced.
'6 McQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS see. 2365(2d ed. 1937). This section was quoted with approval in Payne v.
City of Covington, 276 Ky 380 385, 123 S.W 2d 1045, 1048 (1938).
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income and revenue provided for that year. It pointed out that
in several previous cases it had held that a debt of a muicipality
constituted a permanently valid obligation (subject, presumably,
to the statute of limitations) if at the time it was made it was
valid.4
It seems obvious that such an interpretation, however de-
sirable it may seem to be in a particular case from the standpoint
of a creditor who has dealt with a city in good faith, is not con-
sistent with a true "pay-as-you-go" plan. For example, it allows
the officers of a city, in the early part of the city's fiscal year,
to borrow money up to the amount of the city's income and
revenue provided for that year, and thereafter to expend the
amount so borrowed and all the income provided for that year
without repaying the amount borrowed. Yet at the close of the
fiscal year, although no funds would remain with winch to dis-
charge the obligation, the debt would be valid, since it was valid
when made, and would thus be carried over. It should be noted,
however, that even under the Court's interpretation, it seems
that to constitute a debt "valid when made" the amount bor-
rowed in any year plus the amount of floating debt carried over
from previous years must not exceed the income and revenue
provided for that year.5
The Constitutional provision in question has been the sub-
ject of much litigation from the time it was enacted to the pres-
ent time, and the numerous cases show many conflicts in its
interpretation. The purpose of the limitation has been said to
'Penrod v. City of Sturgis, 269 Ky. 315, 107 S.W 2d 277 (1937)
Geveden, County Treasurer v. Fiscal Court of Carlisle County, 263
Ky. 465, 92 S.W 2d 746 (1936), Randolph v Shelby County, 257 Ky.
297, 77 S.W 2d 961 (1934), accord, Mountain Grove Bank v. Doug-
las County, 146 Mo. 42, 47 S.W 944 (1898), 6 McQuILLIN, THE LAW
OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS sec. 2365 (2d ed. 1937), Contra: Weaver
v. City and County of San Francisco, 111 Cal. 319, 43 Pac. 972 (1896).
Fulton County Fiscal Court v. Southern Bell Telephone & Tele-
graph Co., 285 Ky 17, 35, 146 S.W 2d 15, 25 (1940) ("It was at all
times the duty of the fiscal court to earmark enough of the legally
anticipated revenue to take care of all the governmental expenses
for the year and to reserve that sum. When the balance of the
revenue anticipated was spent or covered by warrants or other ob-
ligations, then there was an exhaustion of revenue. Any money
paid out and any obligation assumed thereafter for non-essential
matters was illegally paid and assumed. And such outstanding
obligations, being void cannot be funded."), Randolph v. Shelby
County, 257 Ky 297, 301, 77 S.W 2d 961, 963 (1934), Hogan v. Lee
Fiscal Court, 235 Ky. 100, 29 S.W 2d 611 (1930).
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be to protect the people from improvident contracts. 6 The cases
show that it does not refer to '.'necessary governmental ex-
penses, '"7 however, or to liabilities imposed by law for what is
done without right or to liabilities for what is done negligently;8
nor was it intended to deprive the municipality of all remedy
necessary to preserve its health and safety in an emergency 9
Thus the Kentucky Court has alwayg tended to give a lib-
eral construction to Section 157 Further, in construing Section
158 of the Constitution, the Court has again evidenced a desire
to be liberal.10 That section limits a municipality's indebtedness
to a certain percentage of the value of the taxable property
therein,"l but contains two provisos relating expressly to debts
contracted before the adoption of the Constitution and con-
cludes with the following separate sentence "Nothing herein
shall prevent the issue of renewal bonds, or bonds to fund the
floating indebtedness of any city, town, county, taxing district
or other municipality " The Court has held that this last pro-
vision is not confined to debts created before the adoption of the
Constitution but authorizes the funding of debts subsequently
incurred.' 2 This holding has been frequently attacked by vari-
ous members of the Court.1S
For a while Section 157 was construed as requiring that the
principal amount of a valid debt at the end of the fiscal year
must be carried over and considered in the financial operations
of the succeeding year.14 However, the Court, "influenced by
OSee Fulton County Fiscal Court v Southern Bell Telephone &
Telegraph Co., 285 Ky. 17, 34, 146 S.W 2d 15, 24 (1940).Ibid., See Ballard v Adair County, 268 Ky. 347, 349, 104 S.W
2d 1100, 1102 (1937) Breathitt County v Cockrell, Jailer, 250 Ky.
743, 751, 63 S.W 2d 920, 923 (1933).8 Xnepfle v City of Morehead, 301 Ky. 417, 192 S.W 2d 189
(1946).
9 See Samuels v City of Clinton, 184 Ky. 97, 104, 211 S.W 567,
570 (1919)
10 It is not the purpose of this note to consider in any detail the
limitations on indebtedness imposed by Section 158 itself.
" This limitation may not be lifted even by a vote of the people,
see Fulton County Fiscal Court v Southern Bell Telephone & Tele-
graph Co., 285 Ky 17, 26, 146 S.W 2d 15, 20 (1940).12 Fulton County Fiscal Court v. Southern Bell Telephone & Tele-
graph Co., 285 Ky. 17, 146 S.W 2d 15 (1940), Hill v City of Cov-
ington, 264 Ky 618, 95 S.W 2d 278 (1936), Hall v. Fiscal Court of
Fleming County, 239 Ky. 425, 39 S.W 2d 656 (1931)
13See note 12 supra.
"Nelson County Fiscal Court v McCrocklin, 175 Ky. 199, 194
S.W 323 (1917) Southern Bitulithic Company v. DeTreville, 156
Ky. 513, 161 S.W 560 (1913)
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the necessity of reading Sections 158 and 157 together in order
to make a complete regulation, later imported into Section 157
the provision of Section 158 winch authorizes the funding of a
floating debt and changed the interpretation." 15 Today, there-
fore, provided the city funds its floating debt, it is required to
consider and charge up against its current revenues in succeed-
ing years only the amount of interest and sinking fund payable
during the particular year, and thus may validly borrow new
money up to the full amount of the income and revenue pro-
vided for the current year less only interest and sinking fund
charges on old debt.1' However, it would still seem that the full
amount of unfunded floating debt must be considered when de-
termining whether any new debt is "valid when made."17
In recent years, the Court had occasionally shown a tend-
ency to tighten up its construction of Section 157 18 In a land-
mark case, Payne v. City of Covington,19 decided in 1938, the
Court first indicated that tendency Prior to that case the term
"revenue provided" in Section 15-7 had been construed as mean-
ing the maximum revenue allowed-under the Constituton,20
but in that decision the Court changed the interpretation to
mean the amount actually provided for by the local taxing
authorities. In rendering its opinion the Court said.
"The framers of our Constitution who gave multi-
plied months to preparation of the instrument which
was later ratified and adopted by the people, knowing
the general tendency of governments and especially
subordinate taxing divisions thereof and their officials
to run into debt and incur liabilities that would affect
"Fulton County Fiscal Court v Southern Bell Telephone &
Telegraph Co., 285 Ky 17, 28, 146 S.W 2d 15, 21 (1940).
"Allen County Fiscal Court v Allen County Farm Bureau, 298
Ky. 220, 182 S.W 2d 660 (1944), Hogan v Lee Fiscal Court, 235 Ky.
100, 29 S.W 2d 611 (1930) However, the entire funded debt is to be
considered in applying the limitation set out m Section 158, Fulton
County Fiscal Court v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co.,
285 Ky. 17, 146 S.W 2d 15 (1940)
For cases upholding a device to escape the debt limitation,
known as the "holding company plan" see Sizemore v. Clay County,
268 Ky 712, 105 S.W 2d 841 (1937) Waller v. Georgetown Board
of Education, 209 Ky. 726, 273 S.W 498 (1925).
" See note 5 supra.
8 See Griffin v Clay County, 304 Ky. 592, 598-599, 201 S.W 2d
733, 737 (1947).
" 276 Ky. 380, 123 S.W 2d 1045 (1938).
-. Carter v. Krueger & Son, 175 Ky 399, 194 S.W 553" (1917)
City of Providence v. Providence Electric Light Co., 122 Ky. 237, 91
S.W 664 (1906).
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their faith and credit and impose onerous burdens upon
the tax paying public placed these positive and wise
limitations upon the powers of the counties, towns, etc.,
to incur debts or impose liabilities upon themselves be-
yond the limitations prescribed in the quoted provisions
without referring the proposition to the voters for ap-
proval.
"The undoubted purpose of the makers of the Con-
stitution and of the people in adopting the inserted
language, supra, of section 157 and its limiting language
found in section 158 was to require counties, municipal
corporations and other tax levying political units to
conduct their affairs on the 'pay as you go' plan, as is
not only clearly evidenced by the language itself, but
which has also been interpreted by all courts before
which questions arising thereunder have been presented,
and by recognized law-writers on the subject as the
declared and undeviating interpretation that should be
given such limiting language.
....... ' ........ .. .. .. .. ... .. .. .. ... . .. ... . ... .. . ... .. .. .. .
11 it is the duty of all persons dealing with polit-
ical subdivisions of the government to do so at their
peril and to take notice of the limitations of their powers
and authority, if ins transaction creates a debt ex-
ceeding that authority he must suffer the consequences.
Such political units speak by their records which are
always open to the public and anyone contemplating
dealing with them may easily inform himself as to the
status of the affairs of the particular unit with which
he proposes to deal.""-
Yet, notwithstanding the strong language used m the Payne
case, the decision in the present case is liberal enough to permit
municipal officers easily to avoid a strict "pay-as-you-go" plan,
as already pointed out herein.
The Court seems to justify its liberal construction on the
ground that any other theory would practically destroy the
ability of municipalities to obtain credit necessary to carry on
their governmental functions.
22
In answer to this it may be stated that for long-term finauc-
mg the -municipality could raise funds by a vote of the people.
It is they who must pay the debts and who should authorize
obligations that cannot be met by the income and revenue pro-
vided for the year in question. For short-term financing the
municipalitv could execute a valid and binding pledge of some
specific municipal fund set apart, out of the general municipal
revenues for that year, for the repayment of such short term
2'276 Ky. 380, 383-388, 123 S.W 2d 1045, 1047-1049 (1938).
"City of Winchester v. Winchester Bank, 306 Ky. 45, 48, 205 S.W
2d 997, 999 (1947).
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obligations.2 3" It should also be "pointed out that the non-avail-
ability of the suggested methods would not handicap a munici-
pality in the exercise of its "necessary governmental functions"
or in emergencies because, as stated above, these situations are
held nQt to be within the purview of the constitutional limitation
-the limitation only applies to improvident contracts.
In conclusion it may be stated that Section 157 of the Ken-
tucky Constitution requires a mumicpality to obtain the assent
of its voters before becoming indebted in any amount exceeding
the income and revenue provided for that year. This should force
the municipality to operate on a "pay-as-you-go" plan. The
doctrine that a municipal debt is valid if valid when made, as
that doctrine has been applied by the Kentucky Court thus far,
strays further than is reasonably necessary from a strict "pay-
as-you-go" plan, since under that doctrine the municipality is
able to borrow money up to the amount of income and revenue
provided for the particular year, and then expend the amount
borrowed plus all the income provided for that year. Thus it
would still end up the fiscal year with a valid debt, while under
strict "pay-as-you-go", no floating debt could be carried over.
Under the decision in the present case this type of debt may be
accumulated as the years go by through funding the floating
debt, which may be done without a vote of the people, and then
the municipality is only required to charge up against its cur-
rent revenues in succeeding years the amount of interest and
smnking fund payable during the year in question. The Court's
contention that any other theory would destroy the ability of
municipalities to obtain credit necessary to carry on their gov-
ernmental functions may be met with the arguments that under
previous decisions the limitation does not apply to "necessary
governmental functions" or emergencies, that ample revenues
may and should be provwded by the then present taxing authori-
ties, that if funds are needed to carry on municipal functions
until collections are made, the credit may be obtained by execut-
ing a valid pledge of specific income to be received, and that if
long term funds are needed the credit may be secured by obtain-
ing the assent of the voters. It may be reasonable to modify the
ISee COOLEY, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS sec. 131-132 (1914).
This argument was presented to the Court in the petition for rehear-
ing in the present case, apparently without success.
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9trict "pay-as-you-go" plan to the extent of refusing to invali-
date debts valid when made in cases where the actual revenues
collected fall below the revenues reasonably anticipated, but it
is submitted that the modification should be extended no
further. If the anticipated revenues are m fact collected, credi-
tors of the city should take the risk of failing to obtain and en-
force a pledge of those revenues. The Court of Appeals, however,
has refused to place any such risk upon creditors of mumcipali-
ties and has permitted a key prop to be cut from under the pro-
tective barrier of Section 157 Mandatory "pay-as-you-go" in
Kentucky seems to exist chiefly as a pious hope.
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